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Canada in recent years has made slow but steady progress in improving its tax system, by shifting taxes
away from productivity-enhancing investment and savings. However, many federal and provincial tax
measures represent targeted preferences, and some are only temporary, and this risks driving resources
away from highly productive ventures and toward politically favoured economic activities.
Comprehensive tax reform would make the tax system more efficient and fair by reducing rates,
broadening bases and relying more on consumption and user-pay related taxes, including environmental
taxes. Relief from taxes on investment and savings would enhance Canada’s economic growth and
improve international competitiveness, in a world in which global linkages among multinational
businesses are critical to achieving better incomes and jobs for Canadian workers.
We present in this Commentary an 80-country ranking of effective tax rates on capital for marginal
investment projects, taking into account corporate income taxes, sales taxes on capital purchases and other
capital-related taxes. Canada has moved from the 6th highest effective tax rate in 2006 (36.6 percent) to the
11th highest in 2007 (30.9 percent). However, much of the reduction has been in manufacturing’s effective
tax rates, which at 23.1 percent are 28th highest in the world sample of 80 countries. Canada’s service
sectors, including construction, transportation, communications, public utilities, trade, business and
household services, remain the 6th highest taxed in the world, at 36.4 percent, or at least 4 percentage
points above the global-weighted average.
Canada’s statutory federal-provincial corporate income tax rate in 2007 is 34.2 percent, the 12th
highest in the world. Though Canada is reducing its corporate income tax rate to 30.5 percent by 2011, our
evidence suggests that this rate is above the tax-revenue-maximizing rate of 28 percent. This Commentary
suggests that all businesses should be taxed at a common rate, equivalent to the small business rate —
roughly 20 percent. Reductions in the current corporate rate could increase corporate tax revenues, as
Canadian and foreign multinationals shifted fewer costs into Canada and fewer profits out of Canada. 
The complementary part of a reform program would shift taxes toward consumption. Broadening
the existing federal-provincial fuel excise tax base, to include other energy sources, would deliver a low-
rate, broad-based, consumption-based environmental tax that put a price on environmental damage. Such
an environmental tax would be part of an overall government strategy to deal with carbon dioxide, and
with pollutants such as sulphur and nitrogen oxides.
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n this 2007 Tax Competitiveness Report, we highlight steady but slow progress
made by Canada in improving its tax system, by shifting taxes away from
productivity-enhancing investment and savings. However, as discussed in a
previous report on federal and provincial 2007 budgets (Chen, Mintz and
Tarasov 2007), many federal and provincial tax reductions were directed to
targeted preferences, some only temporary, rather than broad-based tax cuts.
Targeted tax reductions are not nearly as effective in achieving a better tax system,
because they often result in a misallocation of resources from highly productive to
politically favoured economic activities.
While governments should always keep an eye to fiscal prudence, so that taxes
are only used to support smart spending, it is also important that governments
choose the right tax structure that maximizes economic wealth without
compromising equal opportunities for Canadians. Canada’s tax system is far from
optimal.
Comprehensive tax reform is needed in Canada to make the tax system more
efficient and fair by reducing rates, broadening bases and relying on consumption
and user-pay related taxes, including environmental taxes. Reductions in taxes on
investment and savings will enhance Canada’s economic growth and improve
international competitiveness, in a world in which global linkages among
multinational businesses are critical to achieving better incomes and jobs for
Canadian workers. Relying on less mobile tax bases will reduce the economic cost
of the tax system and the cost of providing government services to Canadians.
Canada continues to apply quite high marginal personal tax rates on labour
income and savings, especially for individuals with modest incomes. Progress in
alleviating many struggling Canadians from extraordinarily high effective
marginal tax rates has been slow. With clawbacks under income-tested programs
combined with payroll taxes, personal marginal tax rates on employment and
savings (outside of pensions and RRSPs) are in excess of 70 percent, far higher
than those faced by the richest Canadians. Major reform is needed to improve the
situation, which to this point has only been tentatively addressed by incremental
changes to tax policies.
We provide in this report our 80-country ranking of effective tax rates on
capital for marginal investment projects, taking into account corporate income
taxes, sales taxes on capital purchases and other capital-related taxes. Canada has
made progress by moving from the 6th highest effective tax rate in 2006 (36.6
percent) to the 11th highest in 2007 (30.9 percent). However, much of the reduction
has been in manufacturing’s effective tax rates which, at 23.1 percent, are 28th
highest in the world sample of 80 countries. Disappointingly, Canada’s service
sectors, including construction, transportation, communications, public utilities,
trade, business and household services, remain the 6th highest taxed in the world,
at 36.4 percent, or at least 4 percentage points above the global-weighted average.
Such high taxes on the service sectors are not going to make Canada’s
economy competitive. Many business services are traded internationally, and their
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* The author wishes to thank Duanjie Chen, Finn Poschmann and Andrey Tarasov for assistance in
developing the most critical parts of this report. The author also appreciates the many comments
provided by members of the Tax Competitiveness Council at the C.D. Howe Institute. Any errors
and omissions rest with the author.costs influence the competitiveness of other industries. Such high taxes on
investment discourage capital investment as well as the adoption of new
technologies and ultimately adversely effect the income paid to workers. For this
reason, Canadian governments should pay attention to broad-based reforms rather
than focus on targeted tax relief limited to a few economic activities.
To their credit, federal and provincial governments are eliminating capital
taxes (levied on a company’s shareholders’ equity and qualifying liabilities) by
2011 for non-financial businesses (although not for financial and insurance
activities, which are globally traded). However, governments seem reluctant to
reduce corporate income tax rates, which remain high. Canada’s statutory federal-
provincial corporate income tax rate in 2007 is 34.2 percent, the 12th highest in the
world. Many countries levy corporate income taxes at rates well below 30 percent
and several countries, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, have
indicated that they will be further reducing corporate income tax rates in the next
several years. Even with future reductions of its own, Canada will continue to
have one of the highest corporate income tax rates in the world.
Corporate income taxes continue to be a major source of inefficiency and
unfairness in the Canadian tax system. They result in highly differential effective
tax rates on industries and assets. They also discourage domestic investment,
which is critical to long-run growth prospects.
Moreover, there is some published evidence — and we shall provide further
analysis in this report — that Canada’s corporate income tax rate is on the wrong
side of the “Laffer curve,” the relationship between government tax rates and tax
revenue.
Canada’s corporate income tax rate is 6 percentage points above the revenue-
maximizing corporate income tax that we estimate. As a result, Canada could
reduce corporate income tax rates, possibly increasing revenue or at worst losing
little. Compared to any other business tax policy, this is a “win-win” proposition
— both government and the private sector would be better off.
Reductions in the current corporate rate would increase corporate tax revenues
because Canadian and foreign multinationals would shift fewer costs into Canada
and fewer profits out of Canada. For example,  Ireland’s corporate income taxes
comprised a 3.4 percent share  of GDP in 2005, which is similar to the corporate
tax collected in Canada as a share of GDP (3.5 percent), even though Canada has a
statutory corporate income tax rate that is almost three times higher than the Irish
rate. The US, with one of the highest corporate income tax rates in the world at
38.5 percent, collects only 2.9 percent of GDP in corporate tax revenue, less than in
Canada where corporate income tax rates are lower. 
Though Canada is reducing its corporate income tax rate to 30.5 percent by
2011, our evidence suggests that this rate is above the tax-revenue-maximizing rate
of 28 percent. However, even if Canada were to reduce its corporate income tax
rate to the revenue-maximization rate, the rate would still be far too high: the
inter-asset and inter-industry distortions induced by corporate taxes suggest that
the optimal corporate rate should be set below the revenue-maximizing rate when
trading off revenues for economic efficiency and fairness. I suggest that all
businesses should be taxed at a common rate that is applied to small businesses —
2 C.D. Howe Institute Commentaryroughly 20 percent — to reduce distortions as much as possible without requiring
substantial change to the tax system.
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An incremental approach to tax reform is one alternative. Federal and
provincial surpluses make it possible for further tax reductions, and Canada’s
efforts to reduce high marginal tax rates on effort, savings and investment could
incrementally improve competitiveness. But rather than a slow-motion approach,
governments could entertain major reforms if they were willing to “bite the
bullet” and pursue two sequential strategies.
The first would be to substantially reduce personal and corporate income tax
rates, with part of the fiscal costs offset by the tax revenues generated from a
broader tax base. We will make a number of recommendations to bring down
federal-provincial personal tax rates on savings and employment income earned
by modest-income taxpayers, combined with proposals to eliminate some
ineffective, targeted tax preferences.
The second strategy would be to shift taxes towards consumption. Clearly, one
possibility is to increase sales-tax rates. A more intriguing possibility is to shift
taxes on “goods” — investment and savings that most affect Canada’s
productivity — to “bads” by, for example, broadening the existing federal-
provincial fuel-excise taxes to include other energy sources. Canada would have a
low-rate, broad-based, consumption-based environmental tax to price the cost of
environmental damage that affects Canadian lives. An environmental tax would
be needed as part of an overall government strategy to deal with carbon and
pollutants such as sulphur and nitrogen oxides. Hence, it would need to be
coordinated with regulatory and other policies directed at pricing environmental
costs. A key aspect of any environmental tax is that it should be broad-based,
affecting consumers and businesses regardless of size or region, thereby enhancing
the overall efficiency and fairness of the tax system.
Both strategies — sharp reductions in corporate and personal tax rates and a
broad-based environmental tax — have been pursued by many OECD countries in
recent years. Canada should consider a similar strategy. Overall, a major tax
reform like this would sharply reduce taxes on investment, savings and
employment, and would enhance Canada’s competitiveness.
Our Current Taxing Problems
Governments take a significant share of the economy’s resources — 38.7 percent —
through taxes and other revenues. On a consolidated basis, Canadian federal,
provincial and local governments collect close to $560 billion in revenues, affecting
each and every Canadian when they earn income, buy goods and services or
purchase property.
2 
Of that amount, $246 billion, or 44 percent, is collected as income taxes
comprised of personal income taxes ($181 billion), corporate income taxes ($58
billion) and non-resident withholding taxes ($7 billion). A further $107 billion, or
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1 At a 20 percent corporate income tax rate, little adjustment would be needed to personal taxes on
dividends and capital gains.
2 Statistics Canada. 2007, CANSIM 385-0001.19.1 percent of revenues, is collected as consumption taxes, including general sales
taxes ($69 billion), excise taxes on fuels, alcohol, tobacco and amusements ($22
billion) and custom duties ($3.6 billion). Contributions to social security programs
add up to $34 billion (6.1 percent of revenues) and property tax payments are $44
billion (7.8 percent of revenues). Other revenues including natural resource taxes
and royalties, user fees, licenses and earnings from investments account for $106
billion of government revenues.
The income tax is the largest and most obvious tax borne by Canadians, made
especially clear when deducted from their employment paycheque. Income taxes
also reduce the return on investments, because interest, dividends and capital
gains are subject to personal tax. Corporate taxes reduce the profitability of
investment projects, which ultimately affects employment income, consumer
prices or investor incomes.
Given that most public corporations raise capital from international markets,
much of the corporate income tax is ultimately borne by Canadian workers
through lower wages and salaries or higher consumer prices. A recent UK study
found that, in the short run, 54 percent of the corporate tax falls on workers by
reducing labour income and, in the long run, over 100 percent is borne by
workers, including productivity losses from reduced investment (Arulampalam,
Devereux and Maffini 2007).
3
Broadly speaking, , all taxes ultimately affect economic behaviour in some way.
Consumption taxes reduce the incentive to work because workers face higher
prices for goods and services when using their hard-earned money to purchase
them. Some sales taxes, such as provincial retail sales taxes, selective taxes on
fuels, insurance premiums and other products, affect not only consumers, but also
business competitiveness, as capital and intermediate goods also bear tax.
Property taxes, differentially applied across municipalities, affect land use
development, and social security contributions can deter effort for some workers.
Below, I review the effect of taxes on economic decisions to work, save and
invest. I shall briefly present results, then focus on some connected issues.
Taxes and Work Effort
Taxation discourages effort when workers face a high marginal tax rate, meaning
the additional tax paid on income earned from one more hour worked. As
demonstrated in last year’s Tax Competitiveness Report, with little change for this
year, marginal tax rates approach 80 percent for incomes around $37,000 in
Canada, and rarely fall below 60 percent for income ranges between $28,000 and
$50,000 in Ontario, for example. The reason for such high marginal tax rates  is
that personal income taxes, payroll tax (EI and CPP) and clawbacks of federal and
provincial income-tested programs all reduce income paid by employers. 
High marginal tax rates encourage people to reduce their effort in favour of
more untaxed leisure or home production, although this is offset by the desire to
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3 In the 2006 Tax Competitiveness Report (Mintz 2006), evidence was provided that corporate taxes
seem to have little effect on the after-tax return on corporate shares traded on the Toronto Stock
Exchange. This is consistent with the results developed in the UK study.receive more compensation to offset the income lost to taxation. A general
conclusion of economic studies is that a 10 percent increase in the after-tax wage
rate encourages about a 1 to 2 percent increase in hours worked by men and a 5
percent increase in hours worked by married women (de Mooij, Evers and van
Vuuren 2006).
High marginal tax rates also encourage individuals to take on tax-planning
activities to avoid tax, or to fail to report income. Recent Canadian analysis on the
sensitivity of the reported income
4 suggest that for employees less than 65 years of
age, a 10 percent reduction in marginal tax rates causes only an 8 percent increase
in reported income while, for self-employed people, taxable income rises by 13
percent
5 (Sillamaa and Veall 2001).
High marginal effective tax rates on income also deter people from investing in
education to improve their future earnings, counteracting the effect of government
subsidies on education (Mintz 2001; Collins and Davies 2005). While governments
provide significant subsidies towards education, they undermine their programs
with a tax system that takes away some of the benefits from acquiring more
knowledge.
Taxing Savings
Canadians wishing to save for their retirement and other contingencies face quite
high tax rates on their investments unless they are able to shelter their income
from taxation through pension plans or RRSPs. Taxes make it hard for Canadians
to accumulate wealth, even by putting aside a regular, fixed amount for savings,
simply because they lower the yield that investors receive. 
For example, a 40 percent tax rate on a 5 percent return on investment reduces
the amount of capital available for retirement, after 20 years, by 33 percent in
current dollars or, after adjusting for 2 percent inflation, by close to 55 percent.
With inflation and taxes, some investors earn a negative return on saving — a
government bond yielding a 4 percent return, subject to a tax rate of 50 percent,
provides after-tax nominal yield of only 2 percent, just covering the loss in
purchasing power when inflation is 2 percent. Taxes in this case are 100 percent of
the inflation-adjusted return to savings.
With longer expected life spans, Canadians will be holding assets for a
considerable time, even after retirement, to maintain a decent standard of living.
For example, in the 2005 taxation year, taxable dividend, investment, rental and
capital gain income for those receiving pension income totaled $6.5 billion, almost
9 percent of their public and private pension income.
6
Taxes on savings are an unfair consumption tax because they tax future
consumption more heavily than current consumption. A tax on savings increases
the price of future consumption relative to current consumption, because investors
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 5
4 The tax base can increase due to tax cuts reflecting tax avoidance, tax evasion or simply more
hours worked or investment.
5 The increased reporting of employment and self-employment income with cuts in marginal tax
rates also reflects a shift in the tax base amongst different sources of income.
6 See Income Statistics 2007, taxable returns by income classes, at www.cra.gc.ca.are rewarded less for their willingness to defer consumption to the future. These
taxes also reduce the degree to which businesses are owned by Canadians and
therefore force Canadian businesses to rely more heavily on foreign savings to
finance investments in Canada.
Marginal tax rates on taxable income from non-pension and non-RRSP saving,
totaling $50 billion in 2005,
7 are particularly high (Figure 1). Federal and
provincial combined marginal tax rates on investment income rarely dip below 40
percent. For those with exceptionally modest incomes — such as seniors with
incomes between $15,000 and $20,000 — marginal tax rates reach 70 percent. Thus,
the highest marginal tax rates on savings are on the poor, not the rich.
When saving through pension plans and RRSPs, Canadians avoid punitive tax
rates on their investment income, as they do not pay tax on income accruing
within such plans. Although Canadians pay tax on withdrawals of interest and
principal, they reduce taxes when contributing to the plans — contributions in
2005 were close to $40 billion. So long as the tax rates at the time of withdrawal
and contribution are the same, the return on savings is untaxed, since the time
6 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
7 Ibid. Taxable income on saving includes $22.3 billion in taxable dividends, $13.7 billion in
investment income, $3.3 billion in rental income and $15.9 billion in taxable capital gains. Interest
and carrying charges and the lifetime capital gains deduction reduced taxable investment income
by $5.6 billion.
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Source: Finn Poschmann, C. D. Howe Institute, via Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and
Model, Release 14.2.
Family taxable income (census families containing seniors)
(dollars)value of taxes paid on withdrawals is equal to the tax savings from contributions.
Shillington (2003) has demonstrated, however, many low-income seniors suffer
high taxes on the returns from their RRSPs and pensions since the clawback of
senior benefits, including the Guaranteed Income Supplement, results in much
higher taxes paid on withdrawals relative to the tax savings achieved by making
contributions to plans prior to retirement.
While Canada has built up a smart system for limiting taxes on the
accumulation of wealth, removing the unfavourable taxes levied on savings could
substantially improve it. 
Taxing Investment
Canada’s standard of living continues to lag that of the United States, because we
are unable to achieve greater productivity, which refers to the amount of goods
and services produced given the resources available to the economy (Statistics
Canada 2007). Many factors are at play, but a well-known difference is the lack of
capital investment by Canadian businesses on a per-worker basis, which is
annually about $700 per worker less than the OECD countries and $1,600 per
worker less than the US (Banerjee and Robson 2007).
Taxes on capital investments have a powerful effect on Canada’s productivity.
Without business investment, companies have difficulty improving labour
incomes, since less production is forthcoming. Businesses also fail to adopt new
innovative technologies if they do not invest in capital. In Table 1, we provide  a
ranking of 80 developed and developing countries in terms of their effective tax
rates applied to the capital investments of multinational corporations.
The effective tax rate is a summary measure indicating the amount of tax paid
as a percentage of the pre-tax returns on investment. The measure is based on the
assumption that the amount of capital stock invested in an industry is determined
by businesses maximizing their stock market values when investing in machines,
structures, land and inventory. Investment is determined at the level where the
risk-adjusted rate of return on capital is at least equal to the cost of capital (Mintz
1995). For example, if the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is 10 percent, a 40
percent effective tax rate on capital reduces the rate of return on capital to 6
percent. If businesses require at least a 6 percent rate of return (net of risk) to
compensate investors for their willingness to invest in the business, then the
company will be willing to undertake a new capital project. If the risk-adjusted
return on projects is less than its cost of capital of 6 percent — say, due to taxation
— the project will be rejected (Box 1).
Canada has been on the right track for some time in reducing its effective tax
rate on capital, but the gains in 2007 have primarily been in manufacturing.
Canada’s effective tax rate on capital — now 30.9 percent, down by almost six
percentage points from 2006, as shown in Table 1 — is 11th highest of 80 countries.
While Canada’s effective tax rate on capital is slightly below the GDP-weighted
average of all 80 countries (the US and other G7 countries tend to have high
effective rates), most countries have a more favourable tax regime than in Canada.
The simple average that gives each country equal weight is only 20.6 percent, over
10 percentage points less than Canada’s.
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of 10 percentage points, reflecting federal and provincial tax credits and some
capital tax reductions. Canadian manufacturing is taxed 28th most highly among
the 80 countries, well below the weighted-average effective tax rate of 31.3 percent
but somewhat more than the simple average of 19.9 percent.
However, for services, the effective tax rate has fallen less from 39.6 percent in
2006 to 36.4 percent in 2007, 6th highest among the 80 countries and well above
even the weighted average effective tax rate on services (31.7 percent). The high
tax burden on services is important in today’s global economy since many services
are traded internationally or contribute to the cost of producing Canadian goods
and services, including manufactured products.
Canada’s effective tax rate on capital would be sharply reduced if sales taxes
on capital goods purchases and capital taxes were eliminated.
8 The effective tax
rate would decline by eight percentage points to 22.3 percent, leaving only the
corporate income tax rate in place. Canada’s effective tax rate on capital would be
35th highest among the 80 countries if only the corporate income tax were levied
on businesses.
Economic studies show conclusively that business taxes significantly affect
investment in a country. Iowerth and Danforth (2004) suggest that a 10 percent
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
Box 1: Calculating the Effective Tax rate 
The effective tax rate is a summary measure indicating the amount of tax paid as a percentage of
the pre-tax returns on investment. The measure is based on the assumption that the amount of
capital stock invested in an industry is determined by businesses maximizing their stock market
values when investing in machines, structures, land and inventory. Investment is determined at
the level where the risk-adjusted rate of return on capital is at least equal to the cost of capital
(Mintz 1995). For example, if the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is 10 percent, a 40 percent
effective tax rate on capital reduces the rate of return on capital to 6 percent. If businesses require
at least a 6 percent rate of return (net of risk) to compensate investors for their willingness to
invest in the business, then the company will be willing to undertake a new capital project. If the
risk-adjusted return on projects is less than its cost of capital of 6 percent — say, due to taxation
— the project will be rejected.
Our calculations take into account corporate income taxes, capital taxes, sales taxes on
capital purchases and other capital-related charges like stamp duties, turnover taxes and
securities transaction taxes. We assume that businesses must earn a rate of return on capital
sufficient to cover an international cost of finance. The latter is based on the typical returns
required by G-7 country investors who are indifferent between holding bond and stock assets,
after adjusting for risk and personal income taxes. Investments in each country are assumed to
have the same structure of assets, leverage ratios, economic depreciation rates and risk-adjusted
real rates of return as in Canada. Differences across countries only reflect tax parameters and
rates of inflation (that affect nominal interest rates across countries). Estimates for 2007 update
data developed in 2006. Any new information that improves estimates for both years has been
incorporated in the analysis. Owing to lack of data, we have not included the Congo in our
estimates this year.
8 For non-financial companies, provincial capital taxes will be eliminated within five years (the
federal capital tax has now been eliminated).C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 9
Statutory Corporate
Income Tax Rate Effective Tax Rates on Capital
Manufacturing Services 2007 Average 2006
percent
Argentina 35.0 49.8 47.5 47.9 47.9
China  25.0 (30.0)
a 48.5 46.8 47.1 49.0
Chad 45.0 45.1 42.7 43.2 43.2
US 38.5 34.7 40.1 37.8 37.8
Brazil 34.0 37.6 36.6 36.6 36.6
Germany 37.0 36.9 35.3 35.7 35.7
Russia 22.0 38.0 34.9 35.7 35.7
France 34.4 33.0 31.7 31.9 31.9
Korea 27.5 32.8 31.0 31.5 31.5
Japan 41.9 35.2 30.4 31.3 31.3
Canada 34.2 (34.4)
a 23.1 36.4 30.9 36.6
Pakistan 35.0 29.9 31.1 30.8 30.8
Costa Rica 30.0 38.6 30.5 30.7 30.7
India 34.0 28.8 30.1 29.8 29.5
Iran 25.0 31.2 28.8 29.3 29.3
UK 30.0 24.4 29.8 28.8 28.8
New Zealand 33.0 29.9 28.2 28.5 28.5
Indonesia 30.0 30.3 26.9 28.2 28.2
Spain 32.5 (35.0)
a 29.5 27.4 27.7 30.0
Australia 30.0 27.7 26.6 26.7 26.7
Lesotho 25.0 12.8 30.6 26.7 26.7
Georgia  20.0 27.6 25.5 25.9 25.9
Ethiopia 30.0 30.7 24.8 25.9 25.9
Sierra Leone 35.0 14.0 27.2 25.3 25.3
Botswana 25.0 11.4 25.3 24.4 24.4
Tanzania 30.0 14.8 25.3 23.6 23.6
Norway 28.0 25.8 23.2 23.5 23.5
Italy 37.3 21.8 23.4 23.1 23.1
Jamaica 33.3 14.6 24.4 23.0 23.0
Peru 30.0 27.3 21.9 23.0 23.0
Finland 26.0 22.4 22.9 22.8 22.8
Kazakhstan 30.0 24.6 22.0 22.5 22.5
Bolivia 25.0 26.4 21.2 22.5 22.5
Tunisia 30.0 (35.0)
a 22.1 22.4 22.3 26.0
Uzbekistan 17.2 (19.0)
a 23.8 20.4 21.3 22.0
Zambia 35.0 18.9 21.6 21.2 21.2
Turkey 20.0 22.7 20.2 20.8 20.8
Luxembourg 29.6 24.1 20.3 20.6 20.6
Fiji 31.0 22.7 19.7 20.3 20.3
Austria 25.0 21.6 19.5 19.9 19.9
Kenya 30.0 -25.7 27.8 19.6 19.6
Bangladesh 30.0 12.4 21.3 19.4 19.4
Uganda 30.0 11.0 20.5 19.0 19.0
Malaysia 27.0 (28.0)
a 20.1 18.3 19.0 19.8
Table 1:  Statutory Corporate Income Rates and Effective Tax Rates on Capital by Country,
2007
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Statutory Corporate
Income Tax Rate Effective Tax Rates on Capital
Manufacturing Services 2007 Average 2006
percent
Vietnam 28.0 24.5 17.0 19.0 19.0
Thailand 30.0 19.8 17.4 18.4 18.4
Ghana 25.0 13.3 19.3 18.2 18.2
Iceland 18.0 19.5 17.6 17.9 17.9
Sweden 28.0 19.3 17.5 17.8 17.8
Jordan 25.0 11.6 19.7 17.6 17.6
Madagascar 30.0 23.4 15.2 17.0 17.0
Morocco 35.0 18.9 16.4 17.0 17.0
Switzerland 21.3 16.6 16.8 16.7 16.7
Trinidad 25.0 3.0 21.5 16.2 20.1
Rwanda 30.0 21.8 15.2 16.1 16.1
Portugal 26.5 (27.5)
a 14.8 16.1 15.9 16.6
Netherlands 25.5 (29.6)
a 18.2 15.0 15.5 18.5
South Africa 29.0 15.5 15.4 15.4 15.4
Poland 19.0 14.4 15.0 14.9 14.9
Chile 17.0 14.4 13.8 14.0 14.1
Greece 25.0 (29.0)
a 18.0 13.2 13.8 16.2
Ecuador 15.0 15.6 12.7 13.4 13.4
Denmark 25.0 (28.0)
a 16.5 12.7 13.4 15.4
Mauritius 22.5 (25.0)
a 13.8 13.2 13.3 15.2
Mexico 28.0 (29.0)
a 17.1 12.1 13.1 13.7
Hungary 16.0 12.9 12.0 12.2 12.2
Slovak Republic 19.0 13.3 11.7 12.0 12.0
Ireland 12.5 12.7 11.7 12.0 12.0
Egypt 20.0 10.6 12.4 11.9 11.9
Czech Rep 24.0 13.2 10.4 11.2 11.2
Romania 16.0 10.7 9.4 9.8 9.8
Singapore 18.0 (20.0)
a 6.4 11.6 9.3 10.6
Croatia 22.0 10.7 8.5 9.2 9.2
Ukraine 25.0 14.4 6.0 8.2 8.2
Hong Kong SAR 17.5 3.6 6.2 5.6 5.6
Latvia  15.0 6.5 5.4 5.6 5.6
Nigeria 32.0 7.6 4.5 4.9 4.9
Bulgaria 10.0 (15.0)
a 5.0 4.9 4.9 7.8
Belgium 34.0 -6.0 -4.1 -4.5 -4.5
Serbia 10.0 -12.5 -3.0 -5.8 -5.8
Weighted Average
b
All 80 countries 34.9 31.3 32.4 31.7 32.1
OECD members 36.3 30.9 32.3 31.5 31.8
Simple Average
All 80 countries 26.8 19.9 20.8 20.6 21.0
OECD members 27.6 21.5 20.8 20.8 21.3
Table 1 (cont’d):  Statutory Corporate Income Rates and Effective Tax Rates on Capital
by Country, 2007
Notes:  Effective tax rates on capital investments incorporate corporate income taxes, sales taxes on capital
purchases and other capital-related taxes including asset and net worth taxes, stamp duties on
securities, taxes on contributions to equity. Property taxes are not included due to lack of data. 
a Countries with a corporate income tax rate reduction for 2007 have their 2006 corporate income tax
rates shown in parentheses. 
b Weighted by GDP in constant 2000 US dollars for the period 2000-2005.
Source:  Calculations by Duanjie Chen with corporate income tax rates adopted from Ernst and Young, 2007
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, various country
chapters; Tax Notes International, various issues in 2007; and certain government websites.reduction in the cost of capital can increase investment in machinery and
equipment by 10 percent in Canada. More powerful results have been obtained by
studies on foreign direct investment (FDI), showing that a 1 percent reduction in
the effective tax rate on capital can increase foreign direct capital stock by about
3.3 percent (de Mooij and Enderveen 2003).
We analyze the impact of effective tax rates on foreign direct investment as a
share of GDP in 2005 (for 69 countries), taking into account the anticipated 2006
effective tax rates, 2004 real growth in GDP, and 2005 inflation.
9 The fitted line for
marginal effective tax rates and foreign direct inflows is shown in Figure 2,
indicating a negative relationship between foreign direct inflows and effective tax
rates.
10
Canada’s position has improved relative to a number of other countries but the
country still has one of most uncompetitive business tax regimes in the world.
While other determinants of capital investment, such as the size of the economy,
infrastructure, the quality of the labour force, regulatory practice and a strong rule
of law also substantially affect investment, taxation plays a significant role. We
found in other work that a one-percentage-point increase in foreign direct
investment inflows to GDP raises the economic growth rate by 0.2 percentage
points (Mintz and Tarasov 2007). Thus, high effective tax rates on capital result in
less foreign direct investment and therefore less economic growth.
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Source: International Monetary Fund; calculations by Andrey Tarasov.
9 Various equations were estimated allowing for other variables such as statutory corporate income
tax rates (insignificant) and for alternative non-linear formulations. The reported result is the
“best” statistical fit.
10 The estimated elasticity is 0.76 implying that a one percentage point increase in the effective tax
rate would reduce foreign direct investment inflows as a share of GDP by 0.76 percent.
Figure 2: The Relationship Between 2005 FDI-Inflow-to-GDP Ratio and 2006 Capital METR 
Rates, 69 countriesCanada is reducing its corporate income tax rate by 2011 to 30.6 percent which,
along with other measures, will reduce its effective tax rate on capital to 27.8
percent. However, several other countries have already indicated further cuts to
corporate income tax rates, as shown in Table 2.
The inference is clear. Canada still has some way to go to become competitive,
never mind creating a distinct advantage relative to most other countries.
Path to Competitiveness: Comprehensive Tax Reform
Canada should be considering comprehensive tax reform by shifting taxes away
from savings and investments, by reducing high marginal rates, and by making
the tax system more neutral. Some of the fiscal costs of reforms can be offset by
using budgetary surpluses generated by a growing economy and disciplined
spending. However, this would not be enough to achieve neutrality or pay for
large rate reductions. Tax rate reductions could also be funded by (i) broadening
tax bases to make the system more efficient and fair; and (ii) by relying on less
distortionary revenue sources, such as increased taxes on consumption. A more
intriguing policy would be to change the existing fuel taxes into a broad-based
energy tax for environmental purposes that would improve efficiency and fairness
by pricing the economic costs of pollution.
In this Commentary, we focus on a major obstacle to Canada’s competitiveness.
Canada’s corporate income tax rate is far too high, at 34.2 percent, or 11th highest
among 80 countries surveyed. That rate needs to be adjusted downwards to
improve competitiveness without imposing a fiscal cost on governments. A central
recommendation is that Canada should take much greater action to reduce
corporate income tax rates, which as argued below, will have little impact on
revenues if the reduction is sufficiently large. Corporate rate reductions should be
the first order of business.
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Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Canada  34.2 32.6 32.1 31.1 30.6
Czech Republic 24.0 21.0 20.0 19.0
France  34.4 Uncertain*
Germany  37.0 30.0
Japan  41.9 Uncertain
UK  30.0 28.0
US  38.5 38.1
New Zealand 33.0 30.0
Mauritius  22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0
Malaysia  27.0 26.0 25.0
Table 2:  Corporate Income Tax Reductions Scheduled or Indicated for Future Years 
Note * The French President has proposed a 25 percent corporate rate.
Source:  Tax Notes International, various issues.Cutting Canada’s Existing 
Corporate Tax Rate Would Increase Revenue 
Some attention in recent years has been paid to the question of whether some
taxes are set at rates so high that their reduction would increase, rather than
decrease, tax revenues. The Laffer curve (Laffer 1979) is based on the premise that
a revenue-maximizing tax rate lies somewhere between zero and 100 percent,
where at the extreme points no revenue would be raised. Laffer argued that tax
rate reductions could increase revenues as a result of expanded economic activity
induced by the tax reform. In other words, the tax rate may be higher than a
revenue-maximizing rate. If that is the case, tax rates should certainly be reduced
to, at most, the revenue-maximizing rate. This would increase revenues and
reduce the economic cost of raising taxes. Further reductions below the revenue-
maximizing tax rates would need to trade off, on one hand, the benefits of raising
taxes to fund public services and, on the other hand, the benefits of reducing
economic distortions caused by the corporate tax system. As public finance theory
has concluded, the optimal tax rate is less than the revenue-maximizing tax rate,
with the objective being to achieve the highest economic gain.
In recent years, economists have paid much more attention to the possibility
that some countries with very high corporate income tax rates might be on the
“wrong side” of the Laffer curve. In other words, reductions in corporate income
tax rates may lead to greater revenues. The suspicion is that a high corporate
income tax could cost governments revenue if the tax base is substantially eroded.
This occurs when multinationals shift income from high-tax to low-tax
jurisdictions using financial transactions and transfer pricing, or by allocating
more investment capital to a low-tax country.
For many policy analysts, the Irish experience has been particularly important
in this regard. Ireland has reduced its corporate income tax rate by more than 40
percent from the late 1980s to 12.5 percent today. Corporate income taxes as a
share of GDP have grown from about 2.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP in 20 years. As
shown in Table 3, Ireland collects more corporate income taxes as a share of GDP
than do G-7 countries where corporate rates are well above 30 percent (only the
UK collects as much corporate income tax revenue as Ireland relative to its size).
Many factors influence corporate tax collections besides the corporate income
tax rate. Countries might collect little revenue as a policy choice if they provide
accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits and other preferences that shrink
the corporate tax base. If an economy is booming, corporate tax revenues increase
as companies use up write-offs reflecting corporate losses accumulated in past
years when profitability was low. Further, countries with larger natural resource
and financial sectors tend to collect more corporate income tax revenues than
others. Economies with high investment rates may also collect more corporate
revenues.
One recent study (Clausing 2007), using data for the period 1979 to 2002,
found the revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate to be 33 percent for
OECD countries, although the rate would be lower for smaller and more globally
integrated economies. Since 2002, however, corporate income tax rates have fallen
several percentage points further (Mintz and Weichenrider 2007).
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 13Given the reduction in corporate income tax rates in recent years, we provide
our own estimate of the revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate. Our
analysis, as explained in Box 2, suggests that the revenue-maximizing corporate
income tax rate for Canada is 28 percent. While this rate is below that estimated in
Clausing (2007), we focused on the post-2001 period, when corporate income tax
rates were far lower than in earlier years. Several different tests were conducted
but, overall, the revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate tended to lie below
30 percent.
In our recommendations below, we suggest a significant reduction in corporate
income tax rates, to a level well below the revenue-maximizing rate. The revenue-
maximizing corporate income tax rate is too high, relative to a tax policy that
would achieve the highest possible standard of living. A significant reduction
would redress the problem of variable effective tax rates on industries and assets
which, as discussed in Chen, Mintz and Tarasov (2007), distort the allocation of
resources in the economy and result in unfairness.
11
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Country
Corporate Income Tax as Percentage
of GDP in 2005



















New Zealand 5.7 33.0
Norway* 12.8 28.0





United Kingdom 3.4 30.0
United States 2.9 39.2
Table 3:  Corporate Tax Revenue and Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates for Various 
OECD Countries in 2005
Note: * Norway levies a 50 percent corporate income tax rate on oil and gas companies.
Source: OECD. Statistics Database. 2007.
11 One could argue that the corporate income tax rate should not be set too low, because Canadian
taxes are credited against foreign taxes for certain countries like the US and Japan, and .....Personal Tax Reforms 
As part of a comprehensive tax reform strategy, Canada needs to reduce high
marginal personal income tax rates, especially as they apply to Canadians with
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Box 2: An Estimate of the Revenue-Maximizing Corporate Income Tax Rate
To estimate the revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate, we regressed corporate income
taxes as a share of GDP by country for 27 OECD countries and by years for the period 2001-2005
on independent variables as listed in the table below. We would expect that corporate tax
revenues would rise and then fall with the corporate income tax rate (to estimate a curve, the
square of the rate is included as a variable). Corporate taxes would increase with (i) greater gross
fixed-capital formation as a share of GDP; (ii) a higher share of the financial and business
services sector to total value-added; (iii) more real GDP growth rate; (iv) greater resource
extraction (especially, for example, in Norway); and vary by each year. We estimated other
equations, not shown here, using a longer panel data set (1995-2005), a cross-section based on
2001-2005 averaged values, oil and gas production, the effective tax rate on capital, and lagged
growth. While results did vary across tests, the maximum corporate income tax rate was
generally found to be below 30 percent. In the reported equation below, the estimated maximum
rate is 28.3 percent.
Independent variables Coefficient Standard Error Probability of Insignificance
Constant -6.327 1.219 0.000
CIT rate (%) 0.278 0.066 0.000
Squared CIT rate -0.005 0.001 0.000
Gross fixed capital formation as 
a share of GDP (%)
0.103 0.014 0.000
Share of financial and business 
services sector VA in total 
VA (%)
0.135 0.025 0.000
Real GDP growth rate, NCU-
based (%)
0.091 0.048 0.060
One-year lag of real GDP growth
rate, NCU-based (%)
0.127 0.047 0.008
Norway dummy (1 for Norway 
for all periods)
7.200 0.434 0.000
Year dummy 2001 -0.182 0.262 0.489
Year dummy 2002 0.064 0.256 0.802
Year dummy 2003 -0.107 0.251 0.671
Year dummy 2004 -0.038 0.257 0.883
F-statistic 30.874
Significance level for F  0.000
R squared 0.734
Adjusted R squared 0.710
Notes:  VA = Value Added; NCU = National Currency Unit
Source: Calculations  by  Andrey  Tarasov.
(footnote 11 cont’d)
consequently, a reduction in Canadian tax paid might result in a larger payment to a foreign
government. However, many foreign-owned multinationals operating in Canada do not pay tax
on income repatriated from Canada, including US companies that use tax-planning opportunities
to eliminate US tax on repatriations. See Mintz and Weichenrieder (2007), chapter 6.modest incomes. In the previous tax competitiveness reports (2005 and 2006), we
argued for several measures that would reduce personal income tax rates. These
included reductions in personal income tax rates for the first bracket, sharp
increases in the exemption level and a new approach to clawing back federal and
provincial income-tested benefits by pooling the amounts to be clawed back at a
single rate to avoid stacking up marginal tax rates.
We will not repeat these recommendations here. However, the existing federal
personal income tax rate applied to the first bracket should be reduced from 15.5
percent to 12 percent. Provincial personal tax rates should also be reduced so that
the combined personal income tax rate faced by those with modest income is no
more than 18 percent.
Tax policies aimed at helping Canadians to fund their future living costs are
needed more urgently as the population ages. Two other personal tax measures
would have a significant impact on savings, generating more income for
Canadians and facilitating saving.
The first is for the introduction of a tax-prepaid savings account (Kesselman
and Poschmann (2001), which would enable Canadians to earn tax-free investment
income and capital gains. Under this approach, Canadians would be able to
contribute up to a limit (such as $10,000) into an account in addition to
contributions made to their pension and Registered Retirement Savings Plans. No
deduction would be provided for contributions to plans and no tax would be
applied to withdrawals. In contrast to the existing current retirement accounts,
those individuals expecting high marginal tax rates after they retire (as shown in
Figure 1), would be better able to average their savings withdrawals to avoid
excessively high taxes. The federal Conservatives promised a similar scheme in
2004, and a Liberal budget in 2003 indicated that the government would consider
its implementation.
The second measure would be to introduce a refundable dividend tax credit
for pension and other retirement savings plans. (At present, only equity
investments held outside such retirement plans are eligible for the dividend tax
credit.) This new measure would offset corporate taxes that have been deducted
from distributions made to these plans. It would also make equities much more
attractive as an investment for retirement accounts, thereby increasing Canadian
ownership of businesses. Mechanisms would be needed to match refunds to the
corporate tax actually deducted from distributions. One such mechanism would
be a corporate distribution tax that would be credited against corporate tax
payments (see the Technical Committee on Business Taxation 1998; and Mintz and
Richardson 2006). 
Business Tax Reforms
In recent years, Canadian governments have reduced corporate income tax rates,
which stood at 43 percent in 2003,  to a more competitive level of 34.2 percent in
2007. Further cuts are planned by 2011, bringing the corporate rate closer to 30
percent. Governments are also eliminating capital taxes on non-financial
companies and, in some provinces, financial companies as well. Retail sales taxes
on business intermediate and capital purchases have also received more attention,
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rate reduction in Saskatchewan and the adoption of a tax similar to the GST in
Quebec and three Atlantic Provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and
Labrador and Nova Scotia). All these are welcome changes and further sales tax
reform would help reduce effective tax rates in Canada. 
However, as detailed above, Canada’s corporate income tax rate remains a
significant impediment to Canada’s competitiveness. Not only does the corporate
income tax contribute to a high effective tax rate on capital, but evidence is
accumulating that governments are shooting themselves in the foot by levying a
corporate income tax rate in excess of a revenue-maximizing corporate rate. A
substantial cut to the corporate rate would potentially increase government
revenues as it would alter substantially the incentive for business to shift profits
out of Canada or by loading debt in Canadian businesses to avoid Canadian tax. 
A corporate rate of 28 percent could simply maximize revenues. However,
even at this level, the corporate rate would be too high, because corporate taxes
cause economic distortions that hurt Canada’s competitiveness, by reducing
investment in high-taxed assets and driving a misallocation of capital resources
among competing businesses. Further, tax policy makes Canada less attractive for
Canadian or foreign-controlled businesses to locate their plants where a small
population and cold weather create regional natural disadvantages.
A sharp reduction in Canada’s corporate income tax rate, to a level such as 20
percent, would be unlikely to have a significant fiscal cost, given that the current
corporate tax rate is well above the revenue maximizing rate. There would be
several advantages for Canada if corporate rates were reduced:
￿ A low corporate income tax rate would increase the incentive for
businesses to locate in Canada. As discussed above, the ultimate gains
would accrue to workers as the corporate tax falls most on labour incomes.
￿ The elimination of the differential between large and small business rates
would help remove the tax penalty imposed on small companies that grow
in size.
￿ Lower corporate income tax rates would reduce differentials in effective
tax rates across assets and industries, thereby lessening distortions that
affect the allocation of capita across businesses. The services sector would
especially benefit from a lower corporate income tax.
￿ The elimination of different corporate income tax rates across business
incomes would significantly simplify the tax system. A single dividend tax
credit could be applied, because all corporate income would be subject to a
single rate. There would be no need to impose complex rules to
differentiate among different sources of income such as manufacturing and
non-manufacturing income, as in Ontario. 
￿ With an exceptionally low corporate income tax, governments could easily
scale back tax preferences related to accelerated depreciation and
investment tax credits, because businesses would have significant incentive
to invest in Canada without special treatment.
￿ Rules applying to the taxation of inbound and outbound investments
could be simpler to apply. With a very low effective tax rate on capital and
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protect the Canadian tax base since less pressure would ensue from
multinationals engaged in income- shifting tax planning.
A brave reform would be to bring the general corporate income tax rate to the
small business rate and levy only a single corporate income tax rate on all
business regardless of industry or size. The federal and provincial corporate
income tax rate could be levied at a rate of 20 percent — a federal rate of 12
percent (by 2011) and an average provincial rate of roughly 8 percent. This reform
would not require changes to personal taxes on capital gains and dividends
eligible for the low tax credit since the combined corporate and personal tax rate
on dividends and capital gains would be the same as the top personal tax rate on
other income.
With a 20 percent corporate income tax rate, Canada would be in the same
league as 13 other countries including Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland and
Switzerland in terms of tax competitiveness.
Base Broadening
While it is appropriate to reduce corporate rates, it would also be important to
make the business tax system more neutral. The tax system should not distort
investment decisions that are best left to the private sector to choose when
pursuing profits. Neutral business tax policies make the tax system more efficient,
fair and simple. Achieving a neutral tax system means scaling back excessively
high capital cost deductions, such as federal and provincial accelerated
depreciation and investment tax credits, and increasing allowed deductions in
cases when the existing tax relief is insufficient to offset the economic cost of
investments.
With a substantial reduction in the corporate income tax, the need for targeted
tax reductions would be lessened; general rate relief would be better for the
broader economy than special preferences for only some activities.
Capital cost allowances have been altered in recent years, with increased rates
to reflect economic depreciation, recently for manufacturing plant and non-
residential buildings. Further adjustments are needed when economic depreciation
rates do not match capital cost allowance rates used for tax purposes. Further,
with inflation, some correction is in order to boost capital cost allowances based
on the historical price of assets (Chen and Mintz 2005 provide an exact calculation,
which depends on the degree to which investment is financed by debt).
A tax system should also be neutral amongst different forms of business
organization (corporations, publicly traded trusts and limited partnerships) and
sources of finance (debt, equity and retained earnings). It should not provide some
taxpayers advantages compared to others in acquiring companies. While the
federal government appropriately removed the incentive for corporations to be
converted into trusts and limited partnerships this past year, it is also important to
remove tax incentives for debt financing. As it is, interest is deductible from
corporate profits while distributions are not. Thus, it is critical to avoid excessive
taxation of shareholder income, which in the present case applies to pension plans
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dividend-paying securities. The recommendation to refund corporate tax
(refundable dividend tax credit) for low-income and tax-exempt entities would
improve neutrality among different forms of business organization, financial
structures and players in acquisition markets.
A more complex challenge is presented by international taxation, since
neutrality is impossible to achieve when countries pursue their independent
corporate tax policies (see Mintz and Weichenreider 2007). The current Canadian
tax system imposes higher taxes on domestic investments compared to outbound
investments by Canadian corporations. But increasing taxes on outbound
investment would create another problem. Given that other countries also provide
favourable treatment to outbound investment, higher taxes on foreign direct
investment by companies based in Canada could impair their competitiveness
relative to competing multinationals resident in other countries.
Thus, corporate tax policies that reduce taxes on domestic investments help
achieve a more neutral taxation of domestic and foreign investments. However,
even in the presence of lower taxes on domestic investment, Canada would need
to protect its own tax base when companies shift debt into Canada as part of
international tax planning arrangements. Tighter rules related to interest
deductibility such as a generalized thin-cap rule limiting related and third- party
debt to 75 percent of domestic assets, similar to Australia, would be appropriate
even if the corporate tax rate is reduced to 20 percent (see Lanthier and Mintz
2007).
In some cases, tax policies should support or penalize investments in the
presence of “spillovers,” which arise when actions by a producer benefit or hurt
the economy. A subsidy is justified in the case of research and development,
because businesses often do not fully capture the returns from investments when
others copy the innovation at little or no cost. As discussed below, a tax penalty
could improve efficiency and fairness in the case of environmental damage, as
well as reduce spillovers arising from producer decisions that harm the
environment.
Whether public policies should be implemented by spending programs, tax
support or regulations is an issue that would need careful analysis. It would be
best not to pollute the tax system with complex measures if more effective policies
can be achieved with public spending or regulation. Tax policies can be ineffective,
and at high revenue cost, if those policies do not alter much economic behavior or
are directed at activities that would have taken place without the tax support.
Various credits could be justifiably eliminated, as economic studies tend to
find little support for their effectiveness or rationale. These include accelerated
depreciation for resource and manufacturing investments both at the federal and
provincial level, labour-sponsored venture capital credits, provincial stock savings
plans and the lifetime capital gains exemption for private company shares, farm
and fishing property.
Support can be justified for research and development on the basis articulated
above. However, the level of support seems excessive. The combined federal-
provincial credits amount to roughly 30 percent of the cost of investment for large
companies and about 40 percent for smaller ones. As the Technical Committee on
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scaled back somewhat to reflect spillovers and eliminate the differential between
the large and small business tax credit rates. For companies that do not pay taxes,
partial refundability could be provided, similar to that for small businesses, to
enable companies to use the credit rather than wait years until they earn income
and pay corporate income tax. (Investment tax credits can be carried forward to
reduce tax payments for a limited number of years.) Given that about 80 percent
of research and development expenditures are related to scientific salaries, it
would be consistent to allow the credit to be applied in part against Employment
Insurance premiums paid by employers and employees, especially when the
premiums paid to EI  are in excess of the true layoff experience of the employer.
Environmental Taxation
as a form of Consumption Taxation
Similar to many countries throughout the world such as Australia and Germany,
Canada should increase its reliance on consumption taxes to fund public services.
One possible measure is to increase the federal GST rate to fund reductions in
distorting taxes on investment and savings. Neither the existing government nor
the opposition parties are considering this form of tax reform. The Conservatives
promise to reduce the GST rate by another percentage point to 5 percent, while
other parties look at reducing personal income tax rates or increasing tax credits to
support low-income Canadians, rather than address the level of taxes on
investment, savings and work effort.
Perhaps a more promising alternative is for governments to rely more heavily
on user-pay related taxes, rather than taxes on investment, savings and work. An
important example of a user-pay tax is an environmental tax, connected to the use
of clean air, water and the environment.
Canadians are increasingly concerned about the environment, and discussions
over global warming have turned governments’ attention to policies that would
reduce greenhouse gas and other emissions related to energy use. Recently, the
Alberta government has announced a policy to reduce energy intensity, with a
carbon tax that would be rebated to the extent that Alberta companies spend the
funds on carbon-reducing technologies. The federal government has proposed in
the next several years to implement a similar scheme.
Generally, OECD economies have been developing a set of voluntary
compliance, regulatory and tax policies to implement ecological reforms (OECD
2006). No single set of instruments to curb emissions has been adopted.
By enabling companies to buy emission permits from a market, regulations
controlling an aggregate emissions level provide greater flexibility than does
regulating technologies to reduce carbon emissions. Permit trading thus “prices”
carbon emissions and, if priced sufficiently high, will create incentives for
businesses to adopt at a cost those technologies that would reduce emissions.
However, trading schemes affect only large producers. Small businesses and the
general population are not directly included in carbon trading schemes, although
the effect of permit-trading schemes on energy prices could reduce household and
small business energy consumption.
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environmental objectives and provide incentives to businesses to adopt
technologies to reduce emissions. Taxes do provide a stable pricing of emissions,
although the effectiveness of a tax in changing behaviour will depend on the size
of the tax and the method by which it is implemented. For example, the UK has a
fuel excise tax that varies by sulphur content — this provides greater incentive to
reduce sulphur emissions.
Typically, 80 percent of environmental taxes among OECD countries are
applied to motor vehicles and fuels with substantially lower tax rates on diesel
(OECD 2006). A few countries have levied taxes on natural gas and electricity.
Substantial exemptions from energy taxes are provided for industries that are
sensitive to international trade, such as in agriculture, manufacturing and public
administration and defense. In some cases, the tax exemption is provided
alongside other policies.
Canada’s environmental taxes tend to be narrowly applied to certain products.
Federal excise taxes on fuels, levied to encourage energy self-sufficiency, are
applied at a rate of 10 cents per litre for aviation fuel and unleaded gasoline (11
cents for leaded) and 4 cents per litre for diesel. Provincial gasoline taxes, arguably
intended to fund roads and highways, vary with the highest rates applying to
gasoline and clear diesel and lowest applying to coloured or dyed propane,
butane, aviation fuel and marine and locomotive fuel.
As the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1998) recommended,
Canada could consider converting the existing fuel excise taxes into broad-based
environmental taxes on various energy sources (natural gas, coal, electricity and
nuclear) and toxins with rates varying according to environmental damage. A
number of basic principles should apply:
￿ Neutrality: An environmental tax should be broadly applied to affect
consumers and large and small business emitters rather than being applied
narrowly to some sectors of the economy. All Canadians must be involved
with strategies to reduce environmental damage.
￿ Policy harmonization: An environmental tax could complement other
policies used to control emissions to provide some incentive for better
environmental practices. The application of the tax should be mindful of
other environmental policies to avoid the doubling or tripling up of
different policies that could significantly harm competitiveness. Federal
and provincial governments should avoid imposing heavy burdens on
some businesses by independently choosing their own policies without
taking into account policies chosen by other levels of government.
￿ Minimal transition costs: Rates should be set sufficiently low at the
beginning in order to minimize economic disruption. Given the high tax on
gasoline, some taxation should be considered for other sources of energy
including diesel, coal, natural gas, nuclear, although only at rates reflecting
environmental damage.
￿ Taxes on a consumption-basis: The tax could apply to consumption by
exempting exports and taxing energy content in imports, leaving other
countries to use public policies to curb harmful environmental practices.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 21￿ Recycle revenues to improve efficiency and fairness in the tax system: With a
broad-based environmental tax, governments would have a new source of
revenue to provide offsets to (i) low-income Canadians facing higher
energy prices and (ii) those industries that are sensitive to international
competitiveness. New revenues should be used to reduce personal taxes on
low-income individuals rather than providing energy rebates that shield
consumers from higher energy prices. High personal income tax rates
should also be reduced more generally to make the tax system more
efficient and fair. The revenues could also be used to fund business tax
reductions that would help spur investment to would improve
competitiveness.
Environmental taxes are unlikely to be effective on their own to reduce emissions
to targeted levels. As seen with alcohol, tobacco and gambling levies, the tax rates
are often set to achieve revenue targets rather than dissuade people from
consuming products. Governments become reliant on the revenue so that other
social objectives can be compromised. Nonetheless, we already have in place taxes
on some energy sources — broadening the taxes to apply to other energy sources
to account for emissions might be policy worth pursuing.
Conclusions
Canada’s tax system remains an obstacle to growth and competitiveness with high
marginal tax rates on work, savings and investment. Marginal personal tax rates
on savings and work effort are far too high, especially on those with incomes
below $35,000. Canada’s effective tax rate on capital is 11th highest among 80
countries — for the service sectors, 6th highest.
At 34 percent, the corporate income tax rate is also too high. Even with the
planned 3.5 percentage-point reduction, Canada’s corporate income tax rate seems
above the revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate of 28 percent. As first
order of business, Canadian and provincial governments should reduce corporate
income taxes. This study recommends a 20 percent rate, uniformly applied to large
and small businesses, to minimize distortions.
Tax reform is needed — not the type that introduces targeted preferences, but
reform that substantially lowers tax rates and achieves greater neutrality by
eliminating differences in tax burdens among economic activities. Tax preferences
should be scaled back. Capital cost allowances should be reformed to reflect better
the cost of replacing assets. A refundable dividend tax credit tied to corporate tax
payments paid by the company distributing its profits would improve neutrality
among businesses and greatly improve returns on pension and other retirement
savings.
Lastly, those provinces with retail sales taxes should consider reforms that
would remove taxes on business intermediate inputs and capital. A VAT similar to
the GST should be adopted in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island and Saskatchewan.
The fiscal cost of these reforms is unlikely to be recovered by using surpluses
generated by disciplined spending and tax revenues. Instead, opportunities to cut
22 C.D. Howe Institute Commentaryrates could be funded by the reduction in tax preferences provided when tax rates
have been too high. Certainly, the development of a coherent environmental tax
that would be broader in application than existing fuel taxes could also be part of
a comprehensive tax reform package to make Canada more competitive.
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